SAFETY4SEA Log Issue 22

58 I SAFETY 4SEA log I January 2018 I ISSUE 22 safety4sea.com SAFETY DIGEST We have reviewed the following case studies to provide this safety digest. The below cases are ideal to be considered on subject items at any forthcoming safety meetings onboard vessel(s). The Incident Root Causes Preventive Actions Fatal Engine Room Fire A vessel operating in coastal waters suffered an engine room fire that resulted in the death of an engineer officer. At the time of the accident, it was performing a task that required the engine room to be manned, even though the vessel normally operated with its machinery space unmanned. While he proceed a fuel leakage repair –without shutting down the engine- fuel from leaking pipe soaked engineer’s coverall with diesel. Sparks from the cutting process ignited diesel causing fire in the engine room. The engineer officer died and the vessel was out of service for a year. • Absence of a risk assessment upon hot work task. • Poor communication between the duty engineer and the rest of the crew. Not regular contact with the OOW, as required. • Not the appropriate coveralls for hot working process, in order to protect from ignitions. • Inadequate maintenance and not any inspection carried out to check and ensure that low pressure fuel system compo- nents work properly. • Inadequate knowledge and lack of training concerning the hot work process. • Precautions to be taken when working on UMS vessels, according to the Code of Safe Working Practices for Seafa- rers 2015. • It is essential that the vessel’s crew carry out risk asses- sments and complete PTWs when appropriate. • Vessel should equipped with fire retardant coveralls which offer protection from ignition during the hot work process. • A 6-monthly inspection of all low pressure fuel system components to be included in a vessel’s SMS. Collision Between Sea-going Tug and Towed Vessel A tug was towing a hulk which deve- loped a 10o list to port. Tug’s master sailed to a local bay so it could be in- vestigated. He went stem to stern with the towed vessel, but he hadn’t esti- mated that the tidal stream was about 0.9kt. Before ordering the anchor drop, he saw the towing vessel bea- ring down on the tug, strucking it aft of midships. The master immediately run the tug aground to avoid sinking, but the towed vessel eventually sank. • Inadequate skills and lack of experience, led to the colli- sion, as the tug master didn’t take the right decisions, in order to avoid the accident. • Absence of communication between the tug master and the rest crew. • Before take a major decision, planning meetings should be carried out. • Crew training concerning the handle of tidal waters is re- quired to get prepared to ope- rate in such conditions without undesirable results. OOW Leaves the Bridge Unattended A small general cargo vessel was ap- proaching its destination in autopilot. The Chief Officer was the OOW and was expecting the pilot boat in about 30 minutes. As soon as he noticed that the pilot boat approached 15 mi- nutes earlier, he decided to leave the bridge unattended in order to greet the pilot himself. After he greeted the pilot, the chief officer run back to the bridge, where after a while the pilot arrived too. • Altough the accident was avoided, chief officer’s inten- tion to greet the pilot, leaving the bridge totally unmanned, could have resulted in a very serious incident. This decision shows not only the chief of- ficer’s inadequate knowledge of handling such situations, but also total absence of supervision. • It is essential to maintain a safe lookout. If a watchkeeper needs to leave the bridge for any reason, a competent person must be present on the bridge before the designated OOW leaves it, as situations can and do change rapidly. In cooperation with SQE MARINE